Women and Justice: Topics: LGBTIQ

The appellant, a gay man, entered into an agreement with the respondents, a lesbian couple in a civil partnership, to donate sperm to the respondents so they could have a baby. It was agreed that the respondents would have full care and custody of the child, effectively as parents. They were to be fully responsible for the child’s upbringing, and the appellant, the sperm donor, would be, at most, considered a “favourite uncle.” It was explicitly agreed that the appellant would not have any responsibility for the child’s upbringing and would not seek to influence it. However, following the child’s birth, he attempted to assert rights as the father. While not seeking custody, he sought to be appointed as a guardian of the child and to have rights of access. The respondents opposed his application, and it was their intention to move to Australia, which the appellant sought an injunction to prevent. This case constituted the first time in which the superior courts of Ireland dealt with the matter of parenthood in assisted reproduction, and both the High Court and Supreme Court took different views of the case. McD’s application to be appointed guardian under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 was unsuccessful in the High Court, which found that the donor had acted dishonestly and deliberately misled them as to his intentions. Emphasising the child’s best interests, the High Court, while acknowledging the importance of the blood link between donor and child, found that this was a rare case in which it was not in the best interests of the child to have a relationship with both of his biological parents. The High Court rejected the applications for guardianship and access, finding that granting them would result in too great a cost to the child: the “loss of a tranquil and calm upbringing.” The Supreme Court took a different approach, however, sympathising with the donor’s perspective. Importantly, the Supreme Court ruled that, under Irish law, the lesbian couple was not a family. There was a strong rejection of the idea of ‘de facto families’ having any legal status or rights in Irish law. This concept was relied on by the High Court, where weight was afforded to the position of the ‘de facto family’ consisting of the couple and the child. In this vein, the Supreme Court rejected the applicability of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court agreed that it was not in the best interests of the child that McD. be appointed guardian, but held that he should have access rights, and remitted the matter to the High Court for determination of the terms of such access. The case is also important regarding the relationship between Irish law and the ECHR, with the Supreme Court highlighting that the Convention is not directly applicable in Irish law and taking a restrictive approach in relation to its interpretation and application. The Supreme Court also warned against domestic courts ‘outpacing’ the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

The plaintiffs, two Irish women in a same-sex relationship, married in Canada and sought recognition of their marriage in Ireland or alternatively the right to marry in Ireland. The Registrar General had declined to make a declaration on the validity of marriages that occur outside the State, stating that this was a matter for the courts under Section 29 of the Family Law Act 1995 (2019 version available here). The respondent Revenue Commissioners rejected the plaintiffs’ claim to their allowances as a married couple under the Taxes Consolidation Acts, stating that “Revenues interpretation of tax law is that the provisions relating to married couples relate only to a husband and a wife.” The plaintiffs sought judicial review of that decision. The Court found that the right to same-sex marriage did not exist under Irish Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights, and consequently the plaintiffs’ claims for recognition of their Canadian marriage and their challenge to the Tax Code must fail. Article 41.3.1 of the Irish Constitution required the State to guard the institution of marriage with special care. The continued relevance of this decision is affected by subsequent changes to Irish law. The Thirty-Fourth Amendment to the Irish Constitution legalized same-sex marriage which is now regulated in law by the Marriage Act 2015.

A Belarusian citizen and a Lithuanian registered their same-sex marriage in Denmark. In the same year, the Belarusian citizen applied for a Residency Permit on grounds of Family Reunification in Lithuania. However, it was denied by the Migration Department because neither same-sex marriage nor same-sex partnership is legal in Lithuania. The District Court affirmed the Migration Department’s decision; however, upon appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court decided to refer the case to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court reiterated their 2011 decision that a family is formed on the basis of “continuous emotional affection, mutual understanding, responsibility, respect, co-parenting, and the like” rather than solely by the institution of marriage. Therefore, the Court concluded that the State must not discriminate based on gender and/or sexual orientation in granting Residence Permits to foreign nationals reuniting with their spouses in Lithuania (see case No. 21/2008). English translation available here.

Danijoje tos pačios lyties asmenų santuoką įregistravo Baltarusijos pilietis ir lietuvis. Tais pačiais metais šis sutuoktinis iš Baltarusijos kreipėsi dėl leidimo gyventi Lietuvos Respublikoje šeimos susijungimo pagrindu. Tačiau, Migracijos departamentas prašymą atmetė, nes Lietuvoje nėra įteisintos nei tos pačios lyties asmenų santuoka, nei tos pačios lyties asmenų partnerystė. Apygardos teismas patvirtino Migracijos departamento sprendimą, tačiau Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas nusprendė perduoti bylą Konstituciniam Teismui, kuris pakartojo savo 2011 metų sprendimą, kad šeima kuriama remiantis „nuolatine emocine meile, tarpusavio supratimu, atsakomybe, pagarba, bendru auklėjimu ir panašiais dalykais“, o ne vien santuokos institucija. Todėl Teismas padarė išvadą, kad valstybė negali diskriminuoti dėl lyties ir (ar) seksualinės orientacijos, atsisakydama suteikti leidimą gyventi Lietuvoje užsienio piliečiams, kurie siekia šeimos susijungimo su savo sutuoktiniais.

The local court denied the petitioner’s motion to certify the approval of her female partner to conduct in vitro fertilization with a third person’s semen. The regional court denied the appeal. It held that the wording of the Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (FMedG) aims to exclude same-sex parenthood. The Supreme Court decided to bring this question to the attention of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court decided that certain sections of the FMedG were unconstitutional. Referencing the European Court of Human Right’s judgements, the Court stressed that same-sex partnerships can fall under the protection of Article 8 of the EHRC as a family. Even though the legislature has discretion in the implementation of new rules, the FMedG is missing sufficient grounds for a differential treatment of same sex couples and heterosexual couples. The impact of this decision was far-reaching because it made it immediately permissible for lesbian couples to receive sperm donations and reproductive medication. Before this decision, these medical treatments were solely available to heterosexual couples.

Das Amtsgericht lehnte den Antrag der Antragsstellerin ab, die Zustimmung ihres weiblichen Partners zur Durchführung einer In-vitro-Fertilisation mit dem Samen einer dritten Person zu bescheinigen. Das Landgericht wies die Berufung zurück. Es vertrat die Auffassung, dass der Wortlaut des österreichischen Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (FMedG) darauf abziele, gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft auszuschließen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof beschloss, den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof mit dieser Frage zu befassen. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof entschied, dass bestimmte Abschnitte des FMedG verfassungswidrig sind. Unter Verweis auf die Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte betonte das Gericht, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften als Familie unter den Schutz von Artikel 8 der EMRK fallen können. Auch wenn der Gesetzgeber bei der Umsetzung neuer Regelungen einen Ermessensspielraum hat, fehlt es dem FMedG an einer ausreichenden Begründung für eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von gleichgeschlechtlichen und heterosexuellen Paaren. Die Auswirkungen dieser Entscheidung waren weitreichend, da sie es lesbischen Paaren sofort erlaubte, Samenspenden und reproduktionsmedizinische Behandlungen in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vor dieser Entscheidung waren diese medizinischen Behandlungen ausschließlich heterosexuellen Paaren vorbehalten.

The plaintiff, a gay man, participated in a gay recreational softball league. Subsequently, he received criticism at his job as a welfare services coordinator for Clayton Country, Georgia, for his sexual orientation and participating in the league. Previously he had received positive professional evaluations. In 2013, Clayton County conducted an internal audit of the funds the plaintiff managed and then dismissed him for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” The plaintiff filed a case with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His case was dismissed by the district court and such dismissal was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court held that it was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fire an employee for being gay or transgender. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” was that firing an employee based on sex was a violation of the Act. This, in turn, applied to one’s homosexuality or transgender status as discrimination on the basis of this required employers to discriminate against employees based on their sex.

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.

X1は女性だったが、男性になるため、性転換手術を受けた。その後、彼は男性として登録し、2008年に女性のX2と結婚した。その翌年、X2は子どもを出産した。2012年、X1は、X1が子どもの父親であること、子どもがX1とX2の婚姻中に生まれたことを戸籍に反映させることを地方公共団体に請求した。戸籍変更を担当する区長は、子どもがX1と血縁関係にないことから、民法774条の適用を受けられないため、申請に問題があると、子の戸籍に父の欄を空欄にして、子がX2の長男であると記入した。X1とX2は、子が民法772条に基づいて「嫡出子」と推定されるべきであるとして、X1を子の父として加えることを要求し提訴した。最高裁は、X1の子と推定すべきであるとし、下級審および区長の判断を棄却し、「性同一性障害の性別の取り扱いの特例に関する法律」第3条第1項に基づき、トランスジェンダーの男性は、法に基づき、あらことで男性として扱われるべきであるとした。これには、結婚して「正当に」子どもを産むことができることも含まれるとした。この判決を受けて、法務省は2014年1月27日に、同様の状況にある家族に対してこの手続きを行うよう指示する通達を出した。その後、国は、そのようなカップル45組の戸籍を訂正した。

In Slovakia, a petition signed by at least 350,000 voters may initiate a referendum as long as the questions relate to public interest. However, the subject of the referendum may not be basic rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court reviews whether the subject of the referendum conforms to the Constitution. In 2014, 408,000 voters signed a petition asking the President to announce a referendum on the following questions: 1) Do you agree that the term “marriage” may not be used to designate any other form of cohabitation of persons other than the union between one man and one woman?; 2) Do you agree that pairs or groups of persons of the same sex may not be allowed to adopt children and subsequently to bring them up?; 3) Do you agree that no other form of cohabitation of persons other than marriage should be accorded the special protection, rights and obligations which are accorded solely to marriage and spouses by the legal system as at 1 March 2014?; and 4) Do you agree that schools may not require children to attend lessons in the field of sexual behavior or euthanasia, if their parents and the children themselves do not agree with the teaching content? The President asked the court to consider whether the first, second, and third questions were admissible as they related to the right to privacy, and whether the last question was admissible as it might interfere with the right to education. The Constitutional Court balanced the inalterability of constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with the impossibility of rejecting every question which might minimally affect a right or freedom. The court held that the irrevocability of human rights means the standard of human rights is as set in the constitutional text. Any referendum questions that would lead to a broadening of human rights would be constitutionally acceptable, and any that would reduce human rights would not be constitutionally acceptable. Thus, the first, second, and fourth question were declared acceptable, and the third unacceptable. This case is available through the search function on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic website here by searching for the case file number (PL. ÚS 24/2014).

The issue in this case was whether the fact that no provision was made for same-sex couples to marry denied those parties equal protection of the law and was thus unfairly discriminating against them because of their sexual orientation, contrary to the Constitution’s protection of sexual orientation. The common law and the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 defined marriage as between man and woman. The Court stated that the exclusion of same sex couples from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage was not a “tangential inconvenience” but a “harsh … statement by the law that same-sex couples are outsiders.” The Court held that the common law and §30(1) of the Marriage Act were inconsistent with §§ 9(1) & (3) of the Constitution to the extent that they did not allow same sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements, and responsibilities that heterosexual couples enjoyed. The Court held that Parliament should remedy this exclusion and, if it does not, courts should read §30(1) of the Marriage Act to include the words “or spouse” after the words “or husband” as they appear marriage vows.

The plaintiff, a councilwoman in the Comune of Lampa, identified as a woman and presented herself to society as a woman, filed a discrimination complaint against the defendant, claiming arbitrary discrimination for failure by the Mayor, as representative of the State, to respect her gender identity. She sued, claiming a violation of Anti-Discrimination Law No. 20.069 (“the Law”). The court, on appeal, reversed the trial court judgment and imposed a fine, finding that the Mayor of the Comune of Lampa had arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiff by failing to respect her gender identity as a woman. The court held that arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made by agents of the State or individuals that lacks reasonable justification, and that causes deprivation, disturbance, or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Constitution or international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and in effect, including gender identity as defined by the LGBTI Unit of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which includes transgender identity. Therefore, the right to an identity is constitutionally protected, including the right to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual. Any deprivation, disturbance or threat to such identifying rights constitutes an arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Law No. 20,609.

La demandante, vecina de la comunidad de Lampa, identificada como mujer y presentada a la sociedad como mujer, interpuso una denuncia de discriminación contra la imputada, alegando discriminación arbitraria por incumplimiento del Alcalde, como representante del Estado, de respetar su identidad de género. Ella demandó, alegando una violación de la Ley contra la Discriminación No. 20.069 (“la Ley”). El tribunal, en apelación, revocó la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia e impuso una multa, al considerar que el alcalde de la comuna de Lampa había discriminado arbitrariamente a la demandante al no respetar su identidad de género como mujer. El tribunal sostuvo que “discriminación arbitraria” significa toda distinción, exclusión o restricción realizada por agentes del Estado o personas que carece de justificación razonable, y que ocasiona privación, alteración o amenaza en el legítimo ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en las normas internacionales, tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por Chile y en vigencia, incluida la identidad de género según la definición de la Unidad LGBTI de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que incluye la identidad transgénero. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la identidad está protegido constitucionalmente, incluido el derecho a identificarse como lesbiana, gay, bisexual, transgénero e intersexual. Cualquier privación, alteración o amenaza a tales derechos identificativos constituye una discriminación arbitraria en el sentido del artículo 2 de la Ley N ° 20.609.

Baby “A” was born with both male and female genitalia. Kenyatta National Hospital issued the baby’s mother with various documents used in the process of carrying out genitogram tests, x-rays, and scans on the baby, and a question mark was entered in the column indicating the child’s sex. To date, the child has never been issued a birth certificate. The petitioners requested a declaration of the court that the Constitution protects and recognizes intersex children. The petitioners claimed that the entry of a question mark on the child’s medical treatment notes offended the child’s rights to legal recognition, eroded their dignity, and violated the right of the child not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The petitioners argued that corrective surgery for intersex children was not necessary unless there was a therapeutic need to conduct the surgery. Finally, they argued that forced genital normalization, involuntary sterilization, unethical experimentation, medical display, reparative therapies, and conversion therapies often lead to irreversible changes to the body and interferes with a child’s right to family and reproductive health rights generally. The court, noting the “silent issues faced by intersex” people stated that an intersex children are “no different than any other” children with a constitutional right to legal recognition and the benefits of nationality, including the right not to face intersex discrimination. However, the court found that the respondent did not violate the petitioners’ fundamental rights and freedom because there was no evidence that the child’s mother had tried to obtain, and therefore had never been unlawfully denied, the child’s legal documents. The court first ordered the First Respondent to report to the court within 90 days about (i) the agency responsible for collecting data on intersex people, (ii) a legislative proposal for registering intersex people as a sexual category, and (iii) a legislative proposal for intersex “corrective surgery” regulations. Second, the court ordered the child’s mother to register the with the Third Respondent and file a copy of the approved registration with the court within 90 days.

The court ruled that a person who was designated male at birth, but who had undergone sex reassignment therapy and who had changed their legal identity to female has the right to change their legal identity back to male, despite having female genitalia. The court further held that Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act can be applied in this situation (i.e., where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity after having undergone sex reassignment therapy). Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act provides the test for changing one’s gender identity as follows: (i) the person feels that they belong to the opposite sex, (ii) the person has been acting in accordance with the desired gender identity, (iii) the person can be expected to live with the chosen gender identity in the future, and (iv) the person is above 18 years old. The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare and the Stockholm Administrative Court denied the petition, arguing that due to the applicant’s previous sex change it cannot be expected that the applicant will continue to live with the chosen identity. On appeal, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal found (a) that it was possible to apply Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act in a case where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity, and (b) that the fact that the applicant had previously gone through a sex change did not indicate that the now-chosen gender identity will not be maintained in the future. Therefore, the Court of Appeal allowed the change of identity.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the social status and injustices caused to the transgender population. The Court noted that under the Constitution of Pakistan, transgender individuals are entitled to enjoy constitutional rights like every other citizen of Pakistan. Over the years, transgender individuals in Pakistan have been deprived of inheritance, other property rights, voting rights, education, and employment due to the stigma and exclusion they have suffered. The Court directed the National Database and Registration Authority to adopt a strategy for recording exact status in the electoral list and the Federal and Provincial Governments to ensure that transgender individuals receive childhood education. The Court directed the Chief Secretaries/Commissioners to consult with the Social Welfare Department to implement the order and prepare a policy that would allow transgender individuals to vote during elections.

The plaintiff, a gay man, challenged the government’s denial of spousal benefits to his husband. The couple had been married in New Zealand. The court observed that Hong Kong law does not recognize same-sex marriage; the Marriage Ordinance defines marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” The court concluded that the government’s denial of spousal benefits therefore did not violate the Basic Law, Bill of Rights, or common law. The plaintiff plans to appeal to Hong Kong’s highest court, the Court of Final Instance.

The Court of Appeal held here that the Department of Civil and National Registration’s refusal to register Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana (LEGABIBO) was an unjustifiable limitation of its members’ rights. The Court of Appeal held that the right to form associations to advocate for legal change is a fundamental component of the right to freedom of assembly and association, and it dismissed the Department of Civil and National Registration’s argument that LEGABIBO’s objectives were contrary to public morality and would encourage the commission of criminal offenses. In its holding, the Court of Appeal protected the right of LEGABIBO and other LGBT advocacy groups to promote the rights of LGBT individuals and to lobby for legal reform.

The plaintiff, a female Venezuelan citizen married to a female Venezuelan citizen, got married in Argentina, where LGBT marriage rights are fully granted to homosexual couples. In the following years, they tried to validate their marriage in Venezuela through a judicial homologation process. Such homologation was denied on the basis that the marriage regulations in Argentina did not comply with the provisions of Article 44 of the Venezuelan Civil Code, which regulates marriage rights in Venezuela and provides that “marriage cannot be entered into except between one single man and one single woman.” Thereafter, the couple conceived a child through the assisted reproduction method in Argentina, who was born and presented for registration as their son in Argentina. Immediately after the baby was born, the couple moved back to Venezuela, where they tried to present the newborn as their son to the Venezuelan competent authorities, requiring that the baby carried the surnames of both mothers. The registration was denied. The couple introduced a complaint before the competent court and the judge decided the registration of the boy was inadmissible. The plaintiff appealed this decision until it reached the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (“TSJ”), Venezuelan’s highest judicial body, which decided to annul the decision of the lower court. The TSJ overruled the lower court’s decision on the basis that the decision violated the plaintiff’s right to present the child as an LGBTIQ couple’s child. Likewise, the TSJ stated that this action violated the child’s constitutional right to have an identity. The TSJ final decision was to allow the registration of the child with both mothers’ surnames.

Brazil’s Supreme Court decided by a majority that transgender individuals could change their legal name and gender originally included in their civil registry, without the presentation of psychological or medical evaluation, hormonal treatment, transition surgery, or any other medical procedure. The majority understood that no judicial authorization is necessary for the amendment, stating only a self-written report of the trans person is sufficient to change his/her legal name.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF decidiu, por maioria de votos, que as pessoas transgêneros podem alterar seu prenome e sua classificação de gênero no registro civil, mediante auto-declaração, sendo desnecessária a apresentação de laudos psicológicos, tratamento hormonais ou procedimentos cirúrgicos ou de autorização judicial.

The accused was prosecuted for assaulting a trans woman and her partner for being transsexual. The accused confessed to calling the victim and her partner “dirty transsexuals” and assaulting them. Following the assault, a doctor determined that the victim was unable to work. The Court found that the facts were uncontested and therefore proven. According to the Court, the accused showed a lack of respect for social norms and the physical integrity of other human beings. Additionally, the Court found the punishment should reflect that the crime was based on the victim’s transsexual status and that the punishment should serve to have a strong deterrent effect. The court convicted the accused and imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50 (i.e., in total EUR 5000))which would be suspended during three years if the accused obeyed the terms of probation.

The plaintiff-appellant, a trans (“a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual”) police officer, applied to be promoted to sergeant within the Cincinnati Police Department. The plaintiff passed the sergeants exam but failed a rigorous training program and was denied promotion. The plaintiff sued the City of Cincinnati, alleging that the denial of her promotion was due to sex-based discrimination and failure to conform to male sex stereotypes, such as wearing makeup, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $320,511 as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff met all four requirements of a claim of sex discrimination: that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied a promotion, and that other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.

The plaintiff-appellant sued his employer, AT&T, in state court under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and AT&T removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff alleged that his immediate supervisor made a series of sexually inappropriate comments to him over the course of a year that created a hostile work environment. These comments included calling him by a girl’s name and telling him he looked like a girl. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his supervisor’s conduct toward him was because of his gender. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff stated in his deposition that he believed that his supervisor made these derogatory comments because he knew or suspected that the plaintiff was gay and that sexual orientation discrimination was not a protected classification under Title VII or Michigan law.

Defendant Mr. H.R.A was convicted of aggravated homicide based on his prior ties and relationship with the victim, Ms. N.A. (his partner), whom he murdered with a gun. Mr. H.RA. was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to Law No. 26,791, Article 80, which provides that “[l]ife imprisonment or confinement shall be imposed upon a person that murders an ascendant, descendent, spouse or ex-spouse or a person that kills another with whom he or she maintains a relationship, irrespective of whether they maintained a joint household.” The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it violates principles of equal protection because it does not afford (or it is not clear that the statute affords) equal protection to similarly situated homosexual couples. In rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the court notes (1) Supreme Court precedent making clear that holding legislation unconstitutional is a grave act that should be taken as a last resort and when it is clear that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional, and (2) the legislation in question sought to introduce as aggravating circumstances factors that had previously been ignored, extending the definition of the concept of “family” to include different family realities.

El acusado, el Sr. H.R.A fue condenado por homicidio con acciones agravadas debido a sus vínculos anteriores y su relación con la víctima, la Sra. N.A. (su pareja), a quien asesinó con un arma. El Sr. H.RA. fue condenado a cadena perpetua con conformidad con la Ley Nº 26.791, Artículo 80, que dispone que “se impondrá la reclusión o el encarcelamiento a una persona que asesine a un ascendiente, descendiente, cónyuge o ex cónyuge o una persona que asesine” otro con quien él o ella mantiene una relación, independientemente de si mantuvieron un hogar conjunto ”. El acusado impugnó la constitucionalidad de la ley, argumentando que violaba los principios de protección igualitaria porque no permite (o no está claro si el el estatuto otorga igual protección a las parejas homosexuales en situación similar). Al rechazar la impugnación del acusado, el tribunal señala (1) el Tribunal Supremo precedente, dejando en claro que mantener la legislación inconstitucional es un acto grave que debe tomarse como último recurso y solamente cuando está claro que la legislación es claramente inconstitucional, y cuando (2) la legislación en cuestión buscaba introducir como circunstancias agravantes factores que anteriormente se habían ignorado, extendiendo la definición del concepto de "familia" para incluir diferentes realidades familiares.

After a Methodist Church minister (applicant) announced to her congregation her intention to marry her same-sex partner, the Methodist Church (respondent) suspended and subsequently discontinued her role as an ordained minister in early 2010. In March 2010, the applicant referred the matter to arbitration according to the Laws and Discipline of the Church. The parties could not agree on the applicant’s procedural rights and the arbitration convener proceeded with the process as provided by the Laws and Discipline of the Church. On her behalf, the convener then entered into a final agreement with the Church in May 2011. In 2012, the applicant approached the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town seeking an order to set aside the arbitration agreement in terms of the Arbitration Act. She contended that she was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation. The High Court held that the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. She then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The majority judgment of that Court agreed with the finding of the High Court. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court made four findings. First, the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. Because the issue related to interpretation of religious doctrine, arbitration would be the appropriate forum. Second, since the applicant had unequivocally disavowed her unfair discrimination claim before the High Court, she was not free to raise the claim for the first time on appeal. Third, pursuant to the principle of constitutional subsidiarity, the applicant should have first brought her unfair discrimination claim to the Equality Court. Finally, the applicant failed to file a notice in terms of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, an omission that deprived other interested parties including religious communities of the opportunity to intervene as parties to the dispute or seek admission as amicus curiae in the High Court. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Nadat ’n predikant van die Metodiste Kerk (applikant) aan haar gemeente aangekondig het dat sy van voorneme is om met haar maat van dieselfde geslag te trou, het die Metodiste Kerk (respondent) vroeg in 2010 haar rol as ’n geordende predikant opgeskort en daarna gestaak. In Maart 2010 het die applikant die saak na arbitrasie verwys volgens die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die partye kon nie saamstem oor die prosedurele regte van die applikant nie en die arbitrasie- sameroeper het voortgegaan met die proses soos bepaal deur die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die sameroeper het namens haar in Mei 2011 ’n finale ooreenkoms aangegaan met die Kerk. In 2012 het die applikant die Wes-Kaapse hooggeregshof, Kaapstad, genader om ’n bevel aan te vra om die arbitrasie ooreenkoms ingevolge die Wet op Arbitrasie tersyde te stel. Sy het aangevoer dat daar onbillik teen haar gediskrimineer word op grond van haar seksuele oriëntasie. Die Hooggeregshof het beslis dat die applikant nie goeie rede vir die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms getoon het nie. Sy het toe appél aangeteken by die Hoogste Hof van Appèl. Die meerderheidsuitspraak van daardie Hof het saam gestem met die bevinding van die Hooggeregshof. Die applikant het verlof gevra om tot die Konstitusionele Hof te appelleer. In ’n eenparige uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof vier bevindings gemaak. Eerstens het die applikant nie goeie gronde getoon om die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms ter syde te stel nie. Omdat dit die kwessie rakende die interpretasie van godsdienstige leerstellings is, sou arbitrasie die gepaste forum wees. Tweedens, aangesien die applikant haar onbillike diskriminasie-eis voor die hooggeregshof onomwonde verwerp het, was sy nie vry om die eis vir die eerste keer op appèl aanhandig te maak nie. Derdens moes die applikant volgens die beginsel van grondwettige subsidiariteit haar eis op onbillike diskriminasie eers by die gelykheidshof ingedien het. Uiteidelik het die applikant versuim om ’n kennisgewing in te dien ingevolge die eenvormige Reëls van die Hooggeregshof, ’n versuim wat ander belanghebbende partye, waaronder godsdienstige gemeensappe, die geleentheid ontneem het om as partye tot die geskil in te gryp of om toelating as amicus curiae in die Hooggeregshof te verkry. Die hof het die appèl gevolglik van die hand gewys.

On February 6, 2009, four transgender individuals (A, B, C, D) identifying as female were arrested and charged with both Loitering and Wearing Female Attire. The police detained the Applicants for the entire weekend without explaining the charges against them. Wearing Female Attire is prohibited under Section 153(1)(XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, chapter 8:02. At the hearing on February 9, 2009, the Chief Magistrate commented that the Applicants were confused about their sexuality and told them they were men, not women, and needed to give their lives to Jesus Christ. The Applicants, who were all unrepresented at the time, pleaded guilty to the charge of Wearing Female Attire. Applicants A, B and D were fined $7,500, and Applicant C was fined $19,500 (Guyanese dollars). The loitering charges were eventually dismissed. The Applicants contacted the Society Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination (SASOD), the Equal Rights Trust’s Guyanese partner, about the case. SASOD agreed to represent Applicants and filed a Notice of Motion challenging the Magistrate’s Court decision and seeking redress. The Applicants argued that the police violated the Constitution because the officers failed to inform them of their arrest and did not permit the Applicants to retain counsel. They also argued that Section 153 (1) (XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act 1893 is: (1) vague and of uncertain scope; (2) irrational and discriminatory on the ground of sex; and (3) a continuing threat to their right to protection against discrimination on the ground of sex and gender under the Constitution. Applicants further argued that, by instructing the Applicants to attend Church and give their lives to Jesus Christ, the Chief Magistrate discriminated against them on the basis of religion, which violated a fundamental norm of the Co-operative of the Republic of Guyana as a secular state in contravention to the Constitution. The Court upheld the Applicants’ claims in relation to their fundamental right to be informed of the reason for their arrest under Article 139 of the Constitution, but rejected all of their other claims. The Court found that the prohibition of cross-dressing for an improper purpose was not unconstitutional gender or sex discrimination, impermissibly vague, or undemocratic. The Court also struck SASOD’s application in full, finding that SASOD did not have standing to be an applicant in the case.

The appellants, both homosexual male citizens of Bangladesh, arrived in Australia and applied for protection visas. To be recognized as refugees, the appellants had to show that they had a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The appellants argued that they belonged to a “particular social group” that was subject to discrimination and harm in Bangladesh by virtue of their homosexuality. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship initially determined that because the appellants had conducted their relationship in a discreet manner in Bangladesh, they would suffer no serious harm if they returned to Bangladesh and continued to keep their relationship secret. For this reason, appellants were initially denied protection visas, and the Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed this decision. The appellant’s appealed to the Federal Court for judicial review and the primary judge dismissed the application, agreeing with the delegate’s reasoning about the discreetness of the appellants’ relationship. Appellants appealed to the Full Federal Court, which also dismissed their appeal. Appellants then appealed to the High Court, which granted them special leave to appeal. The High Court considered whether the Tribunal had erred in requiring or expecting the appellants to behave discreetly in order to avoid persecution. In a four-to-three decision, the High Court found that the Tribunal had erred because it improperly split the social group of homosexual men into two groups, discreet and non-discreet. The High Court held that the expectation that a person take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, does not include the need to be discreet about sexuality, especially given that the appellants may have only been acting discreetly due to the persecution of openly homosexual men in Bangladesh. The case was referred back to the Tribunal for redetermination.

An 18-year old woman died from injuries sustained during acts of exorcism (involving use of boiling water, acid, and beating) carried out at the request of her parents by a healer, a few months after she told her mother that she had homosexual feelings. At first instance, the acts were qualified as torture, and the fact that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable situation (mentally and physically) was considered an aggravating factor. Both the healer and the parents were sentenced by the lower court to prison terms (based on Article 417bis and 417ter of the Penal Code (torture)), but the court held that any possible discriminatory motive based on sexual orientation (which it considered unproven anyway) could not affect the criminal qualification, because the Penal Code does not provide for discrimination as an aggravating factor for torture. Contrary to the lower court, which qualified the acts as torture, the Court of Appeal did not qualify the acts as torture (as the intention of the defendants was not to punish the victim), but as blows and injuries intentionally inflicted without the purpose of manslaughter but leading to death under Article 401 of the Penal Code. In addition, the Court found that the aggravating factors included the failure to protect a vulnerable person (Article 405bis) and the fact that acts were committed by the parents of the victim had been the motive for the exorcism. The healer and both parents were sentenced to jail.

The Civil Registration Act 2019 made technical amendments to the Civil Registration Act of 2004, the purposes of which were to facilitate legislation to provide for registration of the birth of donor-conceived children, and to enable both partners in a same-sex female relationship to have their details recorded in such registrations. Specifically, Section 10 provides for the recording of a ‘parent’s’ details and any parent may so register although the options of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are still available.

The Act provides for parentage in case of donor-assisted human reproduction (“DAHR”) (Part 2), issues relating to DAHR facilities (including acquisition of gametes by operators) (Part 3), and amendments to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Part 4), Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Status of Children Act 1987, Family Law Act 1995, and among other legislation, to reflect rights and responsibilities of spouses or civil partners of biological parents and to take into account DAHR situations. The Act provides that a child born as a result of a DAHR procedure shall have as parents the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, provided that the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant have consented to the latter being a parent to the child (Section 5). When construed as the parents of the child, the mother and any other parent, as the case may be, shall have all parental rights and duties in respect of the child (Section 5(3)). The donor of a gamete or embryo used in a DAHR procedure is not the parent of the child nor do they have any parental rights or duties in respect of the child (Section 5(5) and Section 5(6)). A person can only consent to providing a gamete for use in a DAHR procedure where they have attained the age of 18, have received the necessary information pursuant to the Act, and made a declaration pursuant to the Act (Section 6). An intending mother and her partner must be over the age of 21 to consent to parentage (Sections 9, 11).

The Act provides for recognition of changes of gender, issuance of gender recognition certificates, and conforming amendments to other legislation, including the Adoption Act 2010. Any person of at least 18 years of age who is not married or in a civil partnership, inter alia (Section 9), may apply to the Minister for Social Protection for a gender recognition certificate (Section 8). Where a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, that person’s gender shall from the date of that issue become for all purposes the ‘preferred’ gender and sex (Section 18). The fact that a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person shall not affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child born prior to the certificate’s date of the issue (Section 19), or the disposal or devolution of property under a will (including a codicil), or other instrument executed before the date the Act came into operation (Section 20). The Act also provides for “gender specific [criminal] offenses” in relation to the treatment of people with gender recognition certificates. Notably, where a relevant gender-specific sexual offence could be committed or attempted only if the gender of the person with a gender recognition certificate were not the ‘preferred’ gender, that fact does not prevent the sexual offence being committed or attempted (Section 23). Finally, a person who has a gender recognition certificate may apply to the Minister for Social Protection to revoke the certificate (Section 15).

The 2015 Marriage Act enacted the Thirty-Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland into law, which legalized same-sex marriage. Previously, same-sex couples could enter into civil partnerships under the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010. The Marriage Act amended the Civil Registration Act 2004, inter alia, by adding a provision that allows anything that applies to marriage between two people of the opposite sex to apply to marriage between people of the same sex (Section 5). The Act also provides that nothing therein obliges a religious body to recognize a particular form of marriage ceremony or to solemnize a marriage (Section 7). It also provides for the recognition of certain foreign marriages and registered foreign relationships (Sections 12 and 13) and amends the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 to allow a married couple of the same sex to adopt a child (Section 16).

In 2015, the Lithuanian Military Code of Ethics was amended to include the obligation to “respect and protect the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of every human being, regardless of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, opinion, age, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion.” The original version did not expressly include protection against discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation.

Lietuvos karo etikos kodeksas buvo pakeistas 2015 m. įtraukiant pareigą „gerbti ir ginti kiekvieno žmogaus orumą bei pagrindines teises ir laisves, neatsižvelgiant į jo lytį, rasę, tautybę, kalbą, kilmę, socialinę padėtį, tikėjimą, įsitikinimus ar pažiūras, amžių, lytinę orientaciją, negalią, etninę priklausomybę, religiją“. Pirminėje versijoje nebuvo aiškiai numatyta apsauga nuo diskriminacijos dėl lyties ar seksualinės orientacijos.

Under the Civil Code, same-sex marriages are prohibited. In case of a divorce by mutual consent, the marriage can be dissolved if over a year has elapsed, the spouses have made a contract regarding divorce consequences, and they have full active legal capacity. If a couple has children, they have equal rights and duties as parents, regardless of whether they were married, divorced, or separated. A parent cannot surrender their rights or responsibilities over underage children. An unmarried person can adopt a child only in exceptional cases, and unmarried persons may not adopt the same child. In addition, the adopter must be under the age of 50. Moreover, the Code states that an unmarried adult can change their designated gender if it is feasible medically with conditions for the change prescribed by law. Essential to mention, there is no existing legislation setting out the requirements for gender reassignment (see L. v. Lithuania, even though the case is from 2007, legislation efforts have been stalled to this day). English translation available here.

Pagal civilinį kodeksą tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokos yra draudžiamos. Santuoka gali būti nutraukta bendru sutarimu, jei praėjo daugiau nei metai, sutuoktiniai sudarė sutartį dėl santuokos nutraukimo pasekmių ir jie turi teisinį veiksnumą. Jei pora turi vaikų, jie turi lygias teises ir pareigas kaip tėvai, nepriklausomai nuo to, ar jie susituokę, išsiskyrę ar gyvena skyrium. Tėvas ar motina negali atsisakyti teisių ar pareigų savo nepilnamečiams vaikams. Nesusituokęs asmuo gali įvaikinti vaiką tik išimtiniais atvejais, o nesusituokę asmenys negali įvaikinti to paties vaiko. Be to, įvaikintojas turi būti jaunesnis nei 50 metų. Taip pat, kodekse nustatyta, kad nesusituokęs suaugęs asmuo gali pakeisti paskirtą lytį, jei tai įmanoma mediciniškai, įstatymų nustatyta tvarka. Svarbu paminėti, kad iki šiol nėra galiojančių teisės aktų, nustatančių lyties keitimo sąlygas (žr. L prieš Lietuvą).

The Constitution is an essential pillar of gender equality legislation in Lithuania. Article 29 affirms that human rights may not be restricted, or any privileges granted, on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views.” Further, Article 38 declares that marriage can only be concluded upon free mutual consent between a man and a woman, and that the rights of spouses are equal. The provisions do not declare same-sex marriages or partnerships valid. Article 39 states that working mothers are entitled to paid leave before and after childbirth, and favorable working conditions. English translation available here.

Konstitucija yra esminis lyčių lygybės teisės aktų ramstis Lietuvoje. Straipsnyje 29 teigiama, kad žmogaus teisės negali būti ribojamos ar suteikiamos privilegijos dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, tikėjimo, įsitikinimų ar pažiūrų“. Be to, straipsnyje 38 nustatyta, kad santuoka gali būti sudaroma tik gavus laisvą vyro ir moters tarpusavio sutikimą ir kad sutuoktinių teisės yra lygios. Šios nuostatos nedeklaruoja tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokų ar partnerysčių galiojančiomis. Straipsnyje 39 nustatyta, kad dirbančios motinos turi teisę į mokamas atostogas prieš gimdymą ir po jo bei palankias darbo sąlygas.

The Penal Code includes the follow aggravating circumstances if a crime involves discrimination on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, sexual orientation, sexual harassment, belief or religion, political or ideological convictions, social ideological convictions, social status or origin, or any other form of discrimination.

O Código Penal inclui as seguintes circunstâncias agravantes: se o crime envolve discriminação com base em raça, cor, etnia, local de nascença, sexo, orientação sexual, assédio sexual, crença ou religião, convicção política ou ideológica, convicção ideológica social, status social ou origem, ou qualquer outra forma de discriminação.

Article 240 criminalizes discrimination and incitement to hatred and violence based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity, among others. The sentence is imprisonment for one to eight years.

O artigo 240 criminaliza a discriminação e incitamento ao ódio e à violência baseado em raça, gênero, orientação sexual e identidade de gênero, entre outros. A pena é de prisão de um a oito anos.

Marriage is a voluntary union between a man and a woman in accordance with Art. 12. Under Art. 18, the legal age for marriage is 18, but it can be reduced by up to three years in case of pregnancy, childbirth, or if the person has reached full legal capacity. Such reduction is carried out based on the application of the person wishing to marry and the consent of a parent or guardian is not required.

The Portuguese Constitution in Article 9 provides that it is the duty of the State to promote equality among men and women. Article 13 provides that no one shall be privileged or discriminated against for birth, gender, race, language, place of origin, religion, political or ideological conditions, social or economic status, or sexual orientation. Article 67 states that, in order to protect the family, the state is particularly charged with respect for individual freedom, guaranteeing the right to family planning by promoting the information and access to the methods and means required therefore, and organizing the legal and technical arrangements that make it possible to exercise motherhood and fatherhood with awareness. Article 68 determines that women have the right to special protection during pregnancy and following childbirth, and working women also have the right to an adequate period of leave from work without loss of remuneration or any privileges. Article 109 establishes that the direct and active participation in political life by men and women is a condition for and a fundamental instrument in the consolidation of the democratic system, and the law must promote both equality in the exercise of civic and political rights and the absence of gender-based discrimination in access to political office.

A Constituição portuguesa, em seu artigo 9º, estabelece que é dever do Estado promover a igualdade entre homens a mulheres. O artigo 13 prevê que ninguém deverá ser privilegiado ou discriminado em razão da ascendência, sexo, raça, língua, território de origem, religião, convicções políticas ou ideológicas, instrução, situação económica, condição social ou orientação sexual. O artigo 67 estabelece que, para proteção da família, o Estado deverá garantir, no respeito da liberdade individual, o direito ao planeamento familiar, promovendo a informação e o acesso aos métodos e aos meios que o assegurem, e organizar as estruturas jurídicas e técnicas que permitam o exercício de uma maternidade e paternidade conscientes. O artigo 67 da Constituição dispõe sobre o direito à proteção especial da mulher durante a gravidez e após o parto, tendo as mulheres trabalhadoras ainda direito a dispensa do trabalho por período adequado, sem perda da retribuição ou de quaisquer regalias. Por fim, o artigo 109 estabelece que a participação direta e ativa de homens e mulheres na vida política constitui condição e instrumento fundamental de consolidação do sistema democrático, devendo a lei promover a igualdade no exercício dos direitos cívicos e políticos e a não discriminação em função do sexo no acesso a cargos políticos.

This Act was enacted to enforce the J.Y. Interpretation 748 and made same-sex marriage legal in Taiwan by legislation. The Act provides that two persons of the same sex may form a permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life. Same-sex marriages are bound by requirements and limitations relating to minimum age and consent, consanguinity and bigamy as well as provisions relating to cohabitation, sharing of living expenses, marital property, inheritance rights, grounds for termination, and other matters relating to marriage and its general effects. English translation available here.

This law sets the procedure for granting refugee status; the status of subsidiary protection; cessation and revocation of a refugee status and the status of subsidiary protection; temporary protection, identification documents; the rights and obligations of asylum-seekers, refugees, and aliens under subsidiary protection; and other issues related to asylum in BiH. Article 9 of the Law on Asylum enhances the protection of women as it prohibits the discrimination of aliens on all grounds stipulated in the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination, including sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and sexual characteristics. English translation available through RefWorld External URL.

Pursuant to the law, the Public Defender of Georgia, along with common courts represents a legal mechanism for the protection of equality. People who believe that they were subjected to discrimination on any protected ground in any area of public life, have the opportunity to apply to the court or the Public Defender of Georgia against public agencies and physical or legal entities of private law. (External link hosts an English translation of the law.)

The main objective of this law is to establish a judicial mechanism that allows for an effective reestablishment of the rule of law whenever an act of arbitrary discrimination is committed. Pursuant to this law, arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction that lacks reasonable justification, made by agents of the State or individuals, and that causes deprivation, disturbance or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Political Constitution of the Republic or in the international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and that are in force, in particular when based on race or ethnicity, nationality, socio-economic situation, language, ideology or political opinion, religion or belief, unionization or participation in trade union organizations or the lack thereof, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, age, affiliation, personal appearance, and illness or disability.

Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).

Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.

España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.

The Discrimination Act (“DA”) promotes equality regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or any other identity by defining and prohibiting discrimination and sexual harassment. The DA provides anti-discrimination laws which state that as long as an individual is capable of performing the relevant task, or eligible to receive services, he or she may not be discriminated against based on any identity factors. Moreover, the DA provides that organization leaders are obligated to investigate and take measures to prevent future discrimination or harassment upon becoming aware of such potential discrimination or harassment. Finally, the DA provides immunity provisions for those who report behavior that violates the DA. The penalty for failing to fulfill obligations under the DA is an obligation to pay compensation for the discrimination suffered, decided by the Board against Discrimination, and subject to appeal by the payee.

Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality promotes gender equality, by defining the relevant concepts, setting forth various measures to protect equal rights of genders, and specifying the institutions responsible for gender equality. The Law defines “woman” and “man” as including any person who considers oneself as such, and describes gender identity – which does not require medical intervention – as a “protected characteristic.” Direct and indirect gender discrimination are prohibited under the Law, including less favorable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy, maternity, or sexual orientation, and gender-based violence. Harassment and sexual harassment are also forbidden, and whether a person refuses or surrenders to such behavior shall not be used as a basis for a decision affecting that person in a legal proceeding. The Law directs the Kosovo institutions to implement various general measures to achieve gender equality in Kosovo, including gender mainstreaming in all policies and legislation, gender budgeting in all areas, and ensuring recruitment and appointment are consistent with the requirement for equal representation of women and men. In areas where inequities exist, public institutions are further instructed by the Law to take temporary special measures to accelerate the realization of gender equality, including quotas, preferential treatment, hiring, and promotion. The Law in particular requires legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at all levels to adopt special measures until equal gender representation is achieved. The Law establishes an Agency for Gender Equality to support the implementation of the Law, and further mandates that all ministries and municipalities must appoint gender equality officials, and allocate sufficient resources from their budget, to implement the Law. Discrimination on bases including sex, pregnancy, or birth, is prohibited in employment matters including access to employment or training, and working conditions. In regard to education, the Law proscribes sex discrimination in access to education and scholarships, evaluation results, and attainment of degrees, and mandates the inclusion of gender equality education in school curricula at all levels. Persons who believe the principle of equal treatment has not been implemented in relation to them may initiate proceeding in accordance with the Law on Protection from Discrimination. Violations of the Law are punishable by fines of up to 700 Euros for individuals, and 900 Euros for legal entities. (Unoffocial English version available here.)

This Act is a comprehensive act that replaced several pieces of legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In general, The Equality Act 2010 legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society, and provides equality provisions, including the following:

The Act was adopted to amend several major pieces of legislation in Tasmania, including the Adoption Act 1988, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, and the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, with the purpose of improving and strengthening the rights of trans people. The new provisions make it possible to change legal gender through statutory declaration and remove the previous requirement of having completed gender reassignment surgery before amending a birth certificate. Additionally, gender is now allowed to be taken of birth certificates altogether. The Act entered into force on 5 September 2019.

The Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act makes it illegal for same-sex individuals to marry, enter into a civil union, or gain entitlement to any benefits of a valid marriage. Additionally, it prohibits the public display of same-sex relationships. Any marriage or union entered into legally outside Nigeria is considered void within the country and no related benefits are recognized. The Act specially defines marriage as between a man and a woman and establishes criminal penalties against people who solemnize, witness, or aid various events supporting homosexuality. Sections 2-3; 5(3). The act also prohibits registering any same sex organizations and public displays of same sex romantic affection. Section 4. Punishments include imprisonment for 10-14 years depending on the offense. Section 5.

Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited in all public colleges, community colleges, universities, and all other public institutions of higher learning in the state that are operated by the board of governors for higher education. This prohibition applies to employment, recruitment, and hiring practices, employment benefits, admissions, curricular programs, extracurricular activities including athletics, counseling, financial aid including athletic grants-in-aid, student medical, hospital, and accident or life insurance benefits, facilities, housing, rules and regulations, research, and all other school functions and activities. Notwithstanding these prohibitions, schools may do the following: (i) maintain separate but comparable restrooms, dressing, and shower facilities for males and females, including reasonable use of staff of the same sex as the users of these facilities; (ii) provide separate teams for contact sports or for sports where selection for teams is based on competitive skills, provided that equal athletic opportunities which effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both sexes are made available; (iii) maintain separate housing for men and women, provided that housing for students of both sexes is as a whole both proportionate in quantity to the number of students of that sex that apply for housing and comparable in quality and cost to the student; and (iv) permit the establishment and operation of university based social fraternities and sororities.

Section 1577 of the Portuguese Civil Code provides for the right of marriage, regardless of gender, to anyone over the age of 16, provided that whoever wishes to marry before the age of 18 must also present an authorization of their parents or legal guardians. The Civil Code also provides that marriage requires free will of both parties, and therefore any marriage that is performed without the consent of both spouses is void.

A seção 1577 do Código Civil Português prevê o direito ao casamento, independente de gênero, para qualquer pessoa acima de 16 anos, prevendo que qualquer pessoa que desejar se casar antes dos 18 anos deve apresentar uma autorização dos pais ou responsáveis legais. O Código Civil também prevê que o casamento requer a livre vontade das duas partes, e então qualquer casamento que acontecer sem a vontade de ambos os cônjuges é nulo.

Article 4(6) of the Law on Employment and Work of Foreigners provides that when employing a foreigner, the employer must not put the job seeker in less favourable position due to race, color of skin, gender, age, health condition, that is, disability, religious, political or other convictions, trade union membership, national or social background, family status, property status, sexual orientation, or due to other personal circumstances. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)

The Belize Criminal Code defines and criminalizes rape, including marital rape (Sections 46, 71-74); carnal knowledge of female child (Section 47); procuring or attempting to procure a woman (Section 49-50); compulsion of marriage (Section 58); incest by males (Section 62); abortion, miscarriage, and child destruction (Sections 111-12, 127). The Code mandates a minimum sentence of eight years for rape (Section 46), 12 years of carnal knowledge of a female child (Section 47), and a life sentence for habitual sex offenders (Section 48).

Of particular note:

On May 14, 2013, the National Justice Council issued a resolution stating that competent authorities are not allowed to refuse (a) to celebrate same-sex civil marriages nor (b) to convert same-sex common-law marriages (stable union) into civil marriages. The National Justice Council is a public administrative body that aims to advance the work of the Brazilian judicial system. The resolution was issued after the Supreme Court declared in 2011 that it is unconstitutional to apply a different legal treatment to same-sex common-law marriages (stable union), from the one applied to heterosexual common-law marriages (stable union).

Em maio de 2013, o Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ), que é o órgão da administração pública que visa aperfeiçoar o trabalho do sistema judiciário brasileiro, emitiu resolução estabelecendo que as autoridades competentes não poderiam se recursar a habilitar e celebrar casamento civil entre pessoas do mesmo sexo ou se recusar a converter a união estável entre pessoas do mesmo sexo em casamento civil. Referida resolução foi emitida após o Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF declarar, em 2011, que é inconstitucional a aplicação de tratamento jurídico distinto aos casamentos e união estável entre pessoas do mesmo sexo.

The Collective Labor Agreement No. 95 of 10 October 2008 was established by the National Labor Council to ensure compliance with equal treatment principles at all stages of the employment relationship. Equal treatment implies the absence of discrimination based on several factors, including gender and sexual orientation. The principle of equal treatment must be complied with at every stage of the labor market, e.g., the employment relationship, the conditions for access to employment, conditions for employment, and termination of employment. It was made binding in law by the Royal Decree of 11 January 2009.

Two men published a Facebook post of them kissing, which sparked hundreds of homophobic comments. At their request, an LGBTQ rights advocacy organization complained to the prosecutor’s office, asking to launch an investigation for instigation of homophobic hatred and violence. Both the prosecutor’s office and court on appeal refused on the basis that the post was “eccentric” and the authors’ comments, even though obscene, did not contain actual criminal act and intent. The ECtHR unanimously ruled that Lithuania violated the right to an effective remedy (Article 13), awarding the applicants non-pecuniary damages.

Du vyrai susilaukė šimtų homofobinių komentarų socialiniame tinkle paskelbę įrašą, kuriame jie bučiuojasi. Jų prašymu LGBTIQ teisių gynimo organizacija pasiskundė prokuratūrai, prašydama pradėti tyrimą dėl homofobinės neapykantos ir smurto kurstymo. Tiek prokuratūra, tiek apeliacinis teismas prašymą atmetė, remdamiesi tuo, kad įrašas buvo „ekscentriškas“, o autorių komentaruose nebuvo rimto pagrindo ir visų nusikaltimo požymių. EŽTT vienbalsiai nusprendė, kad Lietuva pažeidė pareiškėjų teisę į veiksmingą teisinės gynybos priemonę bei priteisė pareiškėjams neturtinę žalą. Vertimas lietuvių kalba: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-203614

C. was a citizen of Australia and the United Kingdom who lived with A. as a couple in the State of Victoria and then Queensland. They agreed to have a baby and that C. would be the birth mother. They traveled to Canada and got married and then separated shortly after the marriage. C. is the sole caregiver of the baby and no longer knows of the whereabouts of A. C. wanted to formally dissolve her Canadian legal marriage so that she could remarry or enter a civil partnership in the future. She also wanted to ensure she was not held responsible for A.’s debts. Finally, when traveling abroad, she did not want A. to be deemed her legal spouse in certain countries where the marriage might be recognized and A deemed next of kin. In Queensland, in order to obtain a file a divorce application to dissolve a marriage, a marital relationship must be legally recognized as a marriage. Section 5(1) of the Marriage Act of 1961, which provided the relevant definition of marriage, define this term to mean “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.” Further, Section 88EA of the Act provided that, “a union solemnized in a foreign country between: (a) a man and another man, or 9b) a woman and another woman, must not be recognized as a marriage in Australia.” C. did not file for divorce in Australia because of the laws, nor did she apply in Canada or the United Kingdom because both had residency requirements for divorce. C. filed her claim with the Committee claiming that the denial under Australian law of access to divorce proceedings for same-sex couples who have validly married abroad and the consequential denial of court-based relief in the form of a court order amounts to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to article 1491), ready together with article 291) (equal access to courts and tribunals), and article 26 (equality before the law) of the Covenant. The Committee determined that C. was precluded from accessing divorce proceedings in Australia because her same-sex marriage was not recognized under sections 5(1) and 88EA of the Marriage Act of Australia, whereas couples in specific opposite-sex marriages not recognized in Australia, such as polygamous couples, do have access to divorce. This was found to constitute differential treatment. Australia stated they made a reasonable exception for polygamous marriages to enable parties to such marriages access to the assistance, relief and help provided by the family law courts in relation to (but not limited to) children’s matters, property matters, maintenance matters or divorce. The Committee determined that Australia did not explain why this stated reason does not apply equally to unrecognized foreign same-sex marriages. In the absence of more convincing explanations from Australia, the Committee found that the differentiation of treatment based on sexual orientation to which C. was subjected regarding access to divorce proceedings was not based on reasonable and objective criteria and therefore constitutes discrimination under article 26 of the Covenant. Under article 2(3) of the Covenant, the Committee stated that Australia was under an obligation to provide C. with an effective remedy by providing full reparation for the discrimination suffered through lack of access to divorce proceedings. Australia also was obligated to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future and to review its laws in accordance with the Committee’s views, and to provide the Committee information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s views within 180 days.

This report by the Eurasian Coalition on Male Health (ECOM.ngo) discusses the status and treatment of LGBTQ people in Georgia, specifically gay men, other men who have sex with men (MSM), and trans people. It explains existing legal protections for LGBTQ people, societal attitudes, human rights violations, and recommendations for future progress. (PDF is in English. The External Link offers Russian, English, and Estonian.)