Special project: Internet Law
Jurisdiction and the Internet
Introduction
Issues & short answers
Previous state of the law
Discussion
Future of the law
Authorities Cited
|
Jurisdiction and the Internet
- III. Previous State of the Law
Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) provides the backdrop against which modern
in personam jurisdictional jurisprudence evolved. Under the analysis
set forth in Pennoyer, the due process clause limited personal
jurisdiction to defendants physically present within the territory of
the sovereign.
The increasing complexity of interstate commerce as well as the fictional
nature of "implied consent," led the Court to revisit the physical
presence doctrine in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The standard set forth in International Shoe and refined in its
progeny articulates the minimum contacts framework for analyzing contemporary
in personam jurisdiction. According to the Supreme Court, "due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
If the defendant's forum state contacts are continuous and systematic,
jurisdiction will exist when the nature of the contacts gives rise to
the cause of action.
General jurisdiction is also proper for causes of action wholly unrelated
to the nature of the contacts if the defendant's contacts are continuous
and systematic.
However, jurisdiction is improper if the defendant's contacts are casual
or sporadic and unrelated to the cause of action; "it is essential
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Sporadic activity, even a single act, may yield jurisdiction where
the cause of action is directly related to the activity as in McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957)
According to McGee, mailing a single insurance policy to a policyholder
in the forum state yielded "substantial connection" such that
specific jurisdiction in the forum state was proper for a suit arising
out of that policy.
Subsequent decisions have refined the minimum-contacts test by examining
the foreseeability of litigation in the forum state to determine if
the defendant "should have reasonably expected being haled into
court there," given the nature and substance of his contacts.
In World Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980), the Court rejected jurisdiction
as improper where a New York defendant's only contact with forum state
Oklahoma was the sale of a vehicle in New York that was later driven
to Oklahoma. The World Wide Volkswagen Court further asserted
that the minimum contacts test is a threshold that must be reached before
the court can evaluate "fair play and substantial justice."
In some cases involving intentional torts such as libel, the role of
foreseeability in determining jurisdictional propriety is limited. 
In Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462,
483 (1985), the Supreme Court further refined the minimum contacts
test, holding that a long-term commercial relationship constituted a
"deliberate affiliation with the forum" and thus the possibility
of litigation in that context is reasonably foreseeable. Additionally,
the Supreme Court held that even when minimum contacts are sufficient
to confer jurisdiction to the forum state, jurisdiction must comply
with "fair play and substantial justice" evaluated according
to five factors: (1) the burden on defendant of litigating away from
his or her home state; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interest of the interstate
judiciary in efficiently resolving disputes; and (5) shared interests
in social policies. 
|